...arise simultaneously in imagination as an artificial severance of that which is whole.
From G. Spencer Brown's "Laws of Form;"
"A distinction is drawn by arranging (imagining) a boundary with separate sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing the boundary. For example, in a plane space a circle draws a distinction.
Once a distinction is drawn (imagined), the spaces, state, or contents on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated.
There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents are seen to differ in value.
If a content is of value, a name can be taken to indicate this value."
When wholeness is imaginatively severed, the imaginer usually focuses upon one side of the boundary, only, and ignores the other. One definition of "ignore" is "to deliberately disregard." Another definition is "failure to recognize (re-cognize?)."
Ignoring the explanations and descriptions Brown provides regarding the importance of injunctions in math, science, music, and life, and the implications of those comments, suffice it to say that they revolve around the concept of intent. Getting into this subject would lead to a discussion of the intention to imagine, and therefore the intention (conscious or unconscious) to artificially divide what is seen, and that's a subject for another time and place.
I am simply saying that in order to see anything as separate, one must imaginatively cleave wholeness into two artificial states differing in value. Both the states and the values are imagined although there may be useful reasons for engaging in such imaginings.
I am not a mathematician, so I have no interest in rigorously constructing or re-constructing a calculus of forms in the manner of G. Spencer in order to prove anything. It is simply obvious to me that polar opposites (good and bad, for example), as well as the concept of "thingness" contrasted with "the ground of that which is not-thingness," arise simultaneously and are mutually interdependent.
To imagine a tree one must imagine a boundary dividing all that is tree from all that is not-tree (content differing in value). Thus, the concepts of "treeness" and "not-treeness" mutually and dependently arise even though the ground of "not-treeness" is usually ignored when the subject of trees is being discussed.
Oh my goodness. How did I even get into a discussion that might better be addressed by a mathematician? Recognizing my error, I now quietly tiptoe away, leaving the field of discussion to those who probably enjoy these philosophical technicalities far more than I.
From G. Spencer Brown's "Laws of Form;"
"A distinction is drawn by arranging (imagining) a boundary with separate sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing the boundary. For example, in a plane space a circle draws a distinction.
Once a distinction is drawn (imagined), the spaces, state, or contents on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated.
There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents are seen to differ in value.
If a content is of value, a name can be taken to indicate this value."
When wholeness is imaginatively severed, the imaginer usually focuses upon one side of the boundary, only, and ignores the other. One definition of "ignore" is "to deliberately disregard." Another definition is "failure to recognize (re-cognize?)."
Ignoring the explanations and descriptions Brown provides regarding the importance of injunctions in math, science, music, and life, and the implications of those comments, suffice it to say that they revolve around the concept of intent. Getting into this subject would lead to a discussion of the intention to imagine, and therefore the intention (conscious or unconscious) to artificially divide what is seen, and that's a subject for another time and place.
I am simply saying that in order to see anything as separate, one must imaginatively cleave wholeness into two artificial states differing in value. Both the states and the values are imagined although there may be useful reasons for engaging in such imaginings.
I am not a mathematician, so I have no interest in rigorously constructing or re-constructing a calculus of forms in the manner of G. Spencer in order to prove anything. It is simply obvious to me that polar opposites (good and bad, for example), as well as the concept of "thingness" contrasted with "the ground of that which is not-thingness," arise simultaneously and are mutually interdependent.
To imagine a tree one must imagine a boundary dividing all that is tree from all that is not-tree (content differing in value). Thus, the concepts of "treeness" and "not-treeness" mutually and dependently arise even though the ground of "not-treeness" is usually ignored when the subject of trees is being discussed.
Oh my goodness. How did I even get into a discussion that might better be addressed by a mathematician? Recognizing my error, I now quietly tiptoe away, leaving the field of discussion to those who probably enjoy these philosophical technicalities far more than I.
